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Abstract  
 The politics and ethics of participatory development have been a topic of vibrant debate 
since the 1990s. While proponents assert that participation emancipates and empowers 
marginalized peoples, critics assert that it enacts new forms of control and regulation. This paper 
reads these debates through the analytical lens offered by assemblage thinking. Assemblage 
allows us to foreground affective relations between people and things, and the diagrams of power, 
or ideal sets of force relations, that attempt to direct these affective relations. On this basis, we 
characterize different participatory approaches in terms of their relation to the constitutive power 
of affective relations: modernist participation enacts a will to truth that attempts to objectify and 
control constitutive power through categories such as social capital and vulnerability; 
performative participation recognizes that participatory activities, while still entangled in power 
relations, may develop in ways that might challenge existing power relations, and the designs of 
the project organizer. This characterization helps us identify a politics of life enacted through 
participatory activities: on one hand, a negative biopolitics that problematizes constitutive power; 
on the other, an affirmative biopolitics that creates new possibilities for individual and collective 
life. Assemblage thinking can thus reconfigure participation around an affirmative biopolitics 
that positions the researcher as one resource among others marginalized people might use in their 
struggles against insecurity and suffering.  
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Introduction 
For better or worse, it is difficult to find development or disaster management 
programming that does not have some form of participatory engagement (Maskrey 2011). The 
current interest in participation is part of an ongoing reconfiguration of community-based work 
driven by resistance to top-down, hierarchical, command-and-control style approaches (Ribot 
1999; Blaikie 2006). However, despite its mainstreaming, there is a certain ambivalence in 
participatory research. On one hand, critics argue that participation enables therapeutic styles of 
intervention in civil society (Pupavac 2001). While some argue that this reflects the limited 
aspirations of Western development and collapse of meaningful radical politics (Chandler 2004), 
for others it continues historical patterns of domination (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). On the other 
hand, research in fields such as social and feminist geography has detailed how participation is 
not necessarily reactionary (Pain 2004). Drawing on post-structural accounts of the subject and 
power (more on these below), this work demonstrates how participation can be a performative 
practice that produces new socio-spatial (and ecological) relations (Cameron and Gibson 2005). 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to debates on the ambivalence and contradictions of 
participation (e.g., Mansuri and Rao 2004; Pelling 2007; Cook et al 2013) by reading 
participatory development as an assemblage. Assemblage signals unstable configurations of 
materialities and enunciations – bodies, desires, statements, discourses, strategies, and so forth 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987). As we will detail below, assemblage thinking destabilizes the 
convenient fiction of a stable subject, and directs analytical attention in two directions: first, to 
affective relations that permeate assemblages and create desires and capacities, such as desires 
for betterment, vulnerability reduction, or reduced suffering; second, to diagrams of power that 
attempt to direct these affective relations and channel the constitutive power of bodies coming 
together towards certain outcomes rather than others.
1
 Together, these draw out participation’s 
biopolitical effects:
2
 participation involves a variety of techniques that bring people, things, and 
knowledge together in ways that can consolidate existing ways of life, or create entirely new 
possibilities. While this biopolitics is often read in negative terms – for instance, as the 
production of docile, resilient subjects who live with rather than challenge conditions of 
inequality and vulnerability (Reid 2012) – assemblage thinking points to the potentials for 
affirmative biopolitics. It recognizes the affective potentials that subsist in the event of 
participation – the immanent encounter of people, things, and knowledge – and thus the 
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possibilities to invent new ways of relating to the other that do not reduce the other to a form that 
can be assimilated into, or mastered by, the self (Esposito 2011).  
Thinking participation as an assemblage with biopolitical effects, rather than an 
instrument or discursive framing mobilized by a subject, creates a new set of ethical and political 
challenge for researchers and practitioners alike: how to ‘become’ part of participatory 
assemblages, a process we call here ‘becoming-resource’. To develop these arguments, the paper 
proceeds as follows: the second section specifies assemblage thinking and its use in recent 
development studies research. The third section reviews participatory development and disaster 
management in terms of assemblage thinking. This draws out how participation enacts 
biopolitical effects as it attempts to guide the constitutive force of people, things, and knowledge 
encountering each other in the participatory event. A concluding section reflects on the ethical 
and political implications of approaching participation as an assemblage. 
 
Assemblage Thinking in Development Studies 
A provocative line of research in development studies has begun drawing on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987) understanding of assemblage to analyze development policy and practice (e.g., 
Gidwani 2008; McFarlane 2009; Tsing 2005; Ong 2006). An assemblage is less a thing with 
defined borders and a clear identity than a process: a continual de- and re-composition that is 
only ever partially stabilized. An emphasis on becoming over identity and being differentiates 
assemblage thinking from two related forms of thought: complex systems theory and actor-
network theory (see Ruddick 2010; Anderson et al 2012). For our purposes here, two points are 
key. First, in assemblage thinking, discrete bodies do not pre-exist their relations with one 
another; they are not drawn into relation with other bodies to form a complex system or actor-
network. Instead, they are effects of ontologically prior affective relations that circulate 
throughout an assemblage. Affect signals a pre-individual capacity to affect and be affected by 
other bodies. This capacity is a relational force, the constitutive power to extend the scope and 
quality of being. Our understanding of affect draws on Deleuze’s reading of Spinozist ontology 
(Deleuze 1990, Piercey 1996). Rather than a bifurcated ontology of possibility-reality, in which 
reality is the negation of possibility, Deleuze offers a three-fold ontology of event-virtuality-
actuality. What exists – being – is the messiness of bodies and words juxtaposed with each other: 
the immanence of pure difference, or what Deleuze refers to as the event. The event does not 
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consist of pre-existing bodies brought into relation to each other; it consists of different force 
relations intersecting with each other. The point of impact is a point of immeasurable capacity: 
the potential for force relations to affect each other in any number of ways. Deleuze terms this 
ideal set of affective relations the virtual. As these force relations – affects – move through 
material substance, they congeal into extensive bodies. This is a process of actualization: the 
production, out of pre-individual, intensive affective relations, of individuated entities with 
(always partial) identity, meaning and value (DeLanda 2002).  
Key for our purposes here, Deleuze’s threefold ontology of event-virtual-actual is 
expressive. It offers an account of life as productive, a process of ontogenesis (the creation of 
being) that produces extensive, actual bodies - individuated objects, thoughts, ideas, and so forth 
– and intensive, virtual capacities. From this perspective, any extensive being is always exceeded 
by the virtual potential to become other than it is. For Deleuze, the virtual thus signals the 
‘outside’ of any apparently cohesive and unified object. However, there is no fixed boundary 
between this inside and outside: the virtual always subsists within the actual (Grosz 2001). The 
‘border’ is instead a constantly mobile fractal (Massumi 1992): always moving, never settled, 
and always transgressed with lines of flight, or vectors of potential movement that can 
reconfigure the relations and capacities an assemblage embodies.  
This brings us to our second point. Assemblages are never stable, as above, because they 
embody virtual potentialities: they are effects of force relations brought into relation with one 
another in particular ways, that can always potentially be reconfigured in different ways. Deleuze 
(1988) refers to the particular alignments of force relations as diagrams. Diagrams are virtual 
and incorporeal rather than extensive; they are ‘real without being actual.’ As a virtual set of 
relations between relations, diagrams give order and regularity to pure difference: they align 
affective relations in particular ways in order to actualize specific types of bodies – individuals 
and collectives with certain capacities and desires (Massumi 1992). 
Three examples from recent work in development studies will help illustrate these 
philosophical arguments. First, Vinay Gidwani’s (2008) analysis of development in India 
demonstrates the relations between diagrams and power. Gidwani approaches development as an 
assemblage that synthesizes dispersed elements and produces subjectivizing and objectivizing 
effects. Development ‘reorganizes the conditions – or ecology – of human life for its betterment’ 
(Gidwani 2008: 70) by connecting people, institutions, trees, water, soil, science, local 
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knowledge, and so forth. These diagrammatic connections produce material and affective 
functions that otherwise would not exist: for example, new kinds of economic activity, or the 
desire for a better life. These seemingly innocuous effects become political as development 
machines connect with other apparatuses, such as colonial order or the nation-state. Examining 
the articulation of development with the Indian post-colonial nation-state, Gidwani argues that 
the ‘development state’ deploys development in order to thwart the aleatory: unexpected events 
that could trigger famine, drought and in the extreme, social unrest and revolt.  
Second, Aradhana Sharma’s (2008) work on empowerment in India helps us recognize 
how diagrams are not mutually exclusive. Assemblages can embody multiple and potentially 
conflicting diagrams; their constitutive elements can be structured around multiple diagrams at 
once. This is a kind of contemporaneous multiplicity (Massey 2005), the possibility for 
something to be several things at once because it is transversed by multiple diagrams. Sharma’s 
work on empowerment provides an example of this multiplicity. For Sharma, empowerment is 
irreducible to a single, essentialized meaning. It is part of reactionary neoliberal development 
initiatives designed to create self-sufficient, empowered citizens. It is also part of radical Freirian 
projects of class formation and consciousness-raising, and feminist development approaches, and 
Gandhian framings of development. Each of these forms of empowerment co-exist in a 
productive tension with one another. Their particular governmental effects – that is, the specific 
kind of subjects they produce – depend on how they relate to each other and other historical 
trajectories (such as class, caste, or gender relations), in specific times and places.  
Third, Tanya Murray Li (2007) demonstrates how this multiplicity extends to 
subjectivities. Li argues that community forestry brings together multiple, heterogeneous 
interests, institutions, and actors through practices of assembling. These practices involve various 
kinds of programmes and interventions that do not always align with one another, such as 
attempts to secure community members’ property rights, and efforts to improve their forest 
management practices. Most importantly, there is no fixed set of subjectivities that animate 
struggles over community forestry. A ‘radical’ actor in one arena might be ‘reactionary’ in 
another. The politics of community forestry thus cannot be read through a straightforward matrix 
of domination and resistance. Instead, both power and resistance are contextually specific and 
determined by the relations between institutions, knowledge, and actors that comprise 
community forestry assemblages.  
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These examples all demonstrate how assemblage thinking can highlight previously 
under-acknowledged dimensions of development planning. It helps us recognize how 
development is one assemblage amongst others through which particular subjects, objects, and 
life-worlds are produced. Diagrams of development create new capacities amongst development 
agents, underdeveloped populations, and their surrounding environments: new ways of 
encountering and interacting with other bodies. However, these capacities are never fully 
contained in the meanings, identities, and values of development. These affective excesses give 
development a certain plasticity: in one particular context, development may be a vehicle for 
consolidating neoliberal socio-ecological orderings; it may also provide an avenue for subversive 
resistance, however narrow this path may be. Thus, rather than producing a set of universal, 
categorical truths for understanding and critiquing development practices, assemblage thinking 
directs attention to the contextually-specific relations through which development activities 
produce their effects. It complexifies rather than clarifies an empirical field, and in doing so, 
directs attention to other experiences and knowledges of development, empowerment and, key 
for our purposes here, participation, which deductive, categorical analyses might otherwise erase.  
The remainder of this paper draws on these insights to review research on participation. 
In this way, it seeks to draw attention to the plasticity of participation as an assemblage, and raise 
a distinct set of ethical and political questions around a key techniques of contemporary 
development planning.  
 
Assembling Participation 
The emphasis assemblage thinking places on contextual specificity and contemporaneous 
multiplicity make it well positioned to contribute to current debates over participation. As we 
signaled in the introduction, for much of the past decade researchers have recognized that there is 
no single form of participation (Mansuri and Rao 2004; Parfitt 2004; Hickey and Mohan 2004). 
It is not a homogenous, undifferentiated exercise that empowers the poor or vulnerable. Instead, 
it can take on many forms and have contradictory effects (Cook et al 2013): it may be 
instrumental, emancipatory, democratizing, exclusionary, legitimizing, and so on. 
Assemblage thinking brings a new perspective to this ambivalence. It does not 
understand this ambivalence through the figure of a master subject – a project designer or 
researcher, for example – free to choose between more instrumental or emancipatory project 
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design (cf. Pelling 2007; Gaillard and Mercer 2012). It also does not read participation in terms 
of competing discursive framings that result in more or less democratic forms of participation 
(Cook et al 2013). While these arguments offer valuable insights into the political, ethical, and 
relational complexities of participatory research, ultimately they hinge on the presence of a more 
or less stable subject: in these instances, a subject that reflexively chooses whether participation 
will be instrumental or emancipatory; and a subject that mobilizes discourses to frame 
participation in some ways rather than others, respectively. Instead, assemblage thinking 
recognizes the diagrammatic qualities of participation, and thus analytically severs participation 
from stable subjects of choice and discourse. Like development above, as a diagram participation 
aligns people, things, and knowledges in ways that create particular capacities. At this virtual 
level, participation is potential: the potential institutionally differentiated bodies affecting one 
another have to create different truth effects, and thus produce different ways of living together. 
While the reason these bodies are brought together may reflect specific institutional agendas and 
pre-existing power relations, and their encounter certainly brings different framings into conflict, 
these agendas and frames never fully envelop this potential. There are always other ways bodies 
and knowledges might relate to each other, even as participatory initiatives often reproduce 
dominant social and political economic structures.  
Assemblage thinking thus enables us to approach different styles of participation as 
particular enfoldings of relations between bodies, things, and knowledges, which striate the 
virtual and attempt to structure its constitutive potential towards some purposes rather than 
others. The remainder of this section distinguishes distinct forms of participation on the basis of 
how they actualize this potential. Different forms of participation encode materialities and 
enunciations through distinct sets of concepts and categories that actualize bodies and ideas with 
specific meanings, identities, and values, and thus produce biopolitical effects that researchers 
interpret as more or less emancipatory, more or less hierarchical, and so on. The next section 
reviews modernist forms of participation. 
 
Modernist participation 
A defining characteristic of modernist participation is a liberal will to truth, the desire to 
turn every ‘thing’ into an object that can be perfectly known and controlled. This may at first 
appear contradictory: mainstream approaches to participatory development, following Chambers 
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(1983, 1995), assert that participation enables the poor to represent their own reality, to be 
subjects of their own development. However, making-subject as such occurs through 
objectifying the affective relations that make up the everyday lives of the poor and vulnerable, 
and the process of socio-ecological change, by coding them in categories such as ‘social capital,’ 
‘confidence’, ‘empowerment,’ and ‘transformation’ (Grove 2014a). This encoding is evident in 
the way modernist participation envisions different people coming together: each is an individual 
in possession of interests and unique knowledge. Participation provides an arena in which these 
individuals can voice their interests, communicate with one another, negotiate their differences, 
and reach the most mutually-beneficial outcome possible. Giving each individual ‘voice’ will, 
according to proponents, empower marginalized people and give them greater control over the 
policies and projects that affect their everyday lives. Participatory interventions are justified with 
reference to human rights: for example, local peoples have the right to conduct their own 
assessments of development needs and capacities (eg, Chambers 1995), and they have the right 
to make claims on institutions responsible for reducing insecurities (Chiwaka 2005). 
Key for our purposes here, categories such as voice, empowerment, communication, and 
rights begin to narrow the constitutive possibilities of participation’s virtual structure: 
institutionally differentiated people become actualized as disempowered individuals with rights 
claims needing recognition; affective relations are reduced to acts of verbal communication and 
negotiating between competing interests; and knowledge effects become giving disempowered 
people voice. Each of these categories encodes participation in a modernist imaginary. For 
example, the understandings of communication that underpin much mainstream work draw on 
Habermasian theories of deliberative democracy, which assume interests can be 
unproblematically communicated through language (see Kapoor 2002; Pugh 2005a). The 
affective relations that comprise ‘coming together’ are here reduced to linguistic interactions that 
can be known, improved, and controlled by developing better communication techniques. 
Likewise, voice, empowerment, and rights are shaped by a modernist political imaginary. The 
subject of human rights is an abstract, objectified ‘human,’ a sovereign individual recognized by 
others as possessing rights claims and bearing certain responsibilities. This sovereign subject 
possesses a will that is the source of her interests. To the extent that a stronger will prevents the 
subject from expressing and fulfilling its will, it is disempowered. Empowerment thus becomes 
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an inherently political process of emancipating oppressed wills, which can be achieved through, 
inter alia, participatory activities that give them voice (Brown and Westaway 2011). 
However, this is not the only modernist form of participation. While Chambers’ adoption 
of Habermasian deliberative democracy has greatly influenced development donor organizations 
and state agencies, more radical approaches to participation draw on Freirian pedagogy and 
Marxist political economy. Early strands of participatory disaster management are exemplary 
here. In terms of participation’s virtual structure above, the different people to be involved are 
vulnerable individuals. Their vulnerability is the result of uneven political economic relations 
that leave some people and places more exposed to hazards and less able to cope with disaster 
than others (O’Keefe et al 1976). The creation of difference is an act of conscientization: an 
individual and collective process of identifying uneven capitalist relations as the source of 
vulnerability (Wisner et al 1977). Participatory disaster management provides an arena in which 
radical scholars and vulnerable peoples can reconfigure state-society-donor-private sector 
relations in ways that challenge these political economic inequalities (Maskrey 1994). 
Empowerment is still at stake, but this is empowerment with a radical, collective purpose: 
empowerment not only to reduce poverty and vulnerability, but empowerment to change political 
economic structures that cause these conditions in the first place.  
Disaster research during the 1970s and 1980s thus coded participation through different 
categories, such as vulnerability and political economy, which gave them a more radical edge 
than many contemporaneous participatory activities. However, these radical possibilities were 
largely de-actualized during the de-politicization of disaster management during the 1990s. The 
rise of vulnerability studies in particular began shifting the focus of disaster studies to addressing 
immediate vulnerabilities and suffering rather than long-term structural change (Middleton and 
O’Keefe 1998; Grove 2014c). As a result, participatory disaster management became de-
territorialized from radical categories, techniques, and rationalities, and re-territorialized around 
less overtly political forms of conventional participation (Grove 2013a). For example, categories 
such as social capital allow researchers to envision affective relations amongst vulnerable 
peoples in ways that open these relations to subtle forms of cultural engineering (cf. Pelling and 
High 2005). Likewise, adaptive management techniques delimit how professionals engage with 
community members. For instance, adaptive management techniques can extract local 
knowledge on vulnerability to monitor a project’s effectiveness, and adjust the project midstream 
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if required (Grove 2014b). Together, adaptive management techniques and technical concepts 
such as social capital allow practitioners to align policy and practice with one another (Gaillard 
and Mercer 2012), thus preventing (often inadvertently) the creation of difference. 
These brief examples demonstrate modernist participation’s liberal will to truth. As it 
actualizes in specific fields such as disaster management or development planning, contextually-
specific people and their environments become objectified through techniques and categories 
such as adaptive management, social capital, workshops, transect walks, and so forth (Grove 
2014a). These ‘machinic effects’ – the diagrammatic production of objects and subjects through, 
in this case, participatory programming – have been thoroughly critiqued from critical scholars 
drawing on Foucauldian notions of biopower (see note 2). This work details how participatory 
activities have become instruments for consolidating neoliberal rule amongst marginalized 
populations throughout the global South. It situates participation within the wider shift towards 
immaterial, ‘therapeutic’ (Pupavac 2001) forms of development and disaster management that do 
not seek to lessen economic inequality through material transformation, but rather manage the 
effects of inequality by producing confident, self-sufficient individuals and communities who can 
live with, rather than resist, conditions of material inequality and vulnerability (Pugh 2005b; 
Duffield 2007, Grove 2010). The ‘resilient’ communities and individuals participatory 
techniques produce live with insecurity, vulnerability and poverty, and adapt to these hardships 
in situ rather than migrating or taking part in political activities to disrupt institutions that 
manufacture their vulnerabilities in the first place (Reid 2012, Pugh 2014). From this perspective, 
participation de-potentializes vulnerable peoples whose physical and psychological mobility 
might otherwise threaten the infrastructure that sustains the global political economy (Pugh 
2005a).  
From this angle, the outlook for participation appears bleak. But rather than focus on 
seemingly all-encompassing governmental apparatuses that seamlessly produce their intended 
biopolitical effects, assemblage thinking points towards the outside of governmental apparatuses 
– in this case, to the virtual capacities participation produces. The possibilities for participation 
do not have to be confined to enacting a liberal will to truth; there are always other ways its 
virtual structure can be actualized, other directions the force of affective relations might move. 
One possibility is found in performative forms of participation, to which we now turn. 
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Performative participation 
Our use of the term performative participation lumps together a variety of distinct 
theoretical and practical lineages that do not fit easily together, such as feminism, post-
structuralism, and post-colonialism.
3
 For our purposes here, they share two characteristics that 
allow us to differentiate them from modernist participation: a common understanding of 
subjectivity and power; and an appreciation for the performative aspects of participation. In 
contrast to modernist participation, the subject of participation is not a sovereign individual that 
possesses interests and will. Instead, subjectivity is a relational effect. People come to see 
themselves as subject by virtue of their relations to other people, things, signs and images, 
discourses, and so forth. This view of subjectivity destabilizes a modernist political imaginary 
founded on the sovereign subject. Power is not something that constrains a subject’s will; instead, 
it is relational and productive: it produces subjects with particular identities, agencies, and 
capacities (see Cameron and Gibson 2005; Kesby 2007). In this sense, participation offers one 
arena amongst others in which identities are formed through performative practice. As a 
performance, participation creates identities as participants interact with one another. For 
example, Turnhout et al (2010) demonstrate how participants may enter an exercise in the role of 
‘interested subjects’, but may take on other roles in unexpected ways that cannot be planned for 
or controlled: they may lose interest and stop participating, they may stop advocating their 
interests and work for the success of the group, they may participate in subversive or creative 
ways.  
As such, performative participation involves different kinds of research questions and 
concerns. Key here are the status of ‘things’ and ‘space’ in participatory activities. Both of these 
reflect the impact of seeing participation as performative: if participation is a performance, then 
interaction will be mediated not only through communication, following Habermas, but also 
through affective encounters with the bodies – human and non-human – that make up the space 
of participation. For instance, Askins and Pain (2011) use a participatory art project conducted 
with young people of different ethnic backgrounds to theorize how different objects may 
facilitate (or prevent) transformative interactions across social and cultural difference. The 
materiality of participation – the tools, instruments, devices, and substances used in various 
activities – conducts affective relations that can produce meaningful transformations both inside 
and outside the space of participatory activities. 
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However, this should not be seen as an undifferentiated approach. Indeed, there are key 
differences between early post-structural approaches organized around somewhat narrow 
readings of Foucault, and more recent work inflected by affect theory, performativity, and 
autonomist readings of biopolitics. For instance, a key critique of Habermasian communicative 
rationality came from researchers in participatory planning, who drew on Foucault to argue that 
power produces rationality (e.g., Flyvbjerg 1996; Yiftachel and Huxley 2000). This critique 
worked against the dominance of leading Habermasian-inspired participatory theorists during 
this time (notably Healey 1997, and Forester 1999). While undeniably effective, the critique 
closed off the constitutive possibilities of affective life through categories of power as all-
encompassing governmental assemblages that unproblematically produced their intended 
subjects. In this light, more recent readings of Foucault drawing on his Collège de France 
lectures (esp. Foucault 2007, 2008) reconfigure the relation between biopower and life. Here, 
researchers account for regulatory biopolitical effects while also maintaining a sense of life as 
external, prior, and constantly transgressing governmental interventions, including participation 
(Anderson 2012; Philo 2012).  
Despite these important differences, we can broadly characterize performative 
participation in terms of a distinct ethical comportment to the affective capacities participation 
can generate. Here, participation does not seek to emancipate marginalized peoples by giving 
them voice, or fulfill specific policy aims. Instead, it seeks to create a space – physical, social, 
and psychic – where difference might be produced, recognized, and valued as such. The goal 
here is to create new possibilities for association that might give rise to new identities, enable 
new kinds of reflection on uneven power relations, and engage in new practices that might push 
against these power relations (Cameron and Gibson 2005; Pain 2004; Pugh, 2013). It does not 
seek to reduce people and things to objects that can be known and controlled, but rather seeks to 
create transgressive possibilities, where different people might come together to create different 
ways of living within and against entanglements of power. It is less a means or an end than one 
resource among others that can be drawn on to combat inequalities and suffering (Kesby 2007). 
In short, performative participation replaces a liberal will to truth with a transgressive ethos of 
living together: where modernist participation seeks to objectify, corral and channel the affective 
force of people coming together towards specific aims, performative participation recognizes that 
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this force may enable unforeseen possibilities, even if these may undermine the original 
intentions or roles envisioned by project coordinators.  
 
 At this point, we can draw out two key contributions of thinking participation in terms of 
assemblage. First, assemblage thinking enables us to rethink the divisions between different 
kinds of participation. As above, it suggests that these differences do not emerge from project 
designers’ reflexive, subjective choices. Assemblage thinking de-centers a master-subject : at the 
level of the virtual, the project officer is one person among others brought together to produce 
knowledge effects. Their intentions certainly inflect this process, but do not determine its 
outcomes. Instead, the outcomes of participation – what we reflexively judge to be more or less 
democratic, more or less emancipatory – are machinic effects, products of myriad forces 
juxtaposed with one another, working out their affective tensions within and through 
participatory spaces.  
 Second, along these lines, assemblage thinking draws out how participation is 
inescapably biopolitical. At stake here are the kinds of individual and collective life that 
participatory activities can produce. This is not just a matter of different discursive framings of 
participation that can produce more or less hierarchical forms of participation that preserve or 
upend established knowledge hierarchies (see Cook et al 2013). It also recognizes how the 
material, embodied circulation and interaction of people, things, and knowledge imbues these 
with particular meanings, values, and significance, and thus produces specific forms of 
individual and collective life. From this perspective, modernist participation enacts a negative 
biopolitics that reduces constitutive power, the force of difference, to substances – voice, social 
capital, adaptive capacity – that can be controlled and regulated in ways that do not threaten 
institutions such as sovereignty and property that produce inequality and vulnerability (see Dalby 
2002). Performative participation points toward an affirmative biopolitics, a way of engaging 
with constitutive power that seeks to combat existing forms of suffering, inequality, and 
vulnerability, even if this may threaten systemic persistence (Esposito 2011; Hannah 2011). 
 Assemblage thinking helps us identify a politics of life at the heart of participation. It 
clarifies a new ethical imperative for participatory research and programming: to return 
participation to its virtual structure, to the constitutive possibility of people, things, policies, 
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knowledges, and rationalities coming together. The concluding section offers some possibilities 
for participatory work going forward.  
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has used assemblage thinking to review debates in participatory development. 
Assemblage thinking directs attention to pre-individual affective relations that literally ‘make up’ 
assemblages such as participation and development, and the diagrammatic interventions that 
attempt to synthesize these force relations in particular forms rather than others. As such, it 
inculcates sensitivity to the outside of any programmatic intervention into socio-ecological life: 
the virtual structure of this encounter, the constitutive power of juxtaposed materialities and 
enunciations. Attention to this virtual field enables us to differentiate forms of participation in 
terms of their relation to constituent power. Here, we separated modernist participation organized 
around a liberal will to truth and modernist political imaginary from performative participation 
organized around a transgressive ethos – but other differentiations would surely be possible.  
 To be sure, in practice things are not as clear-cut as this. A will to truth, or other forms of 
division and objectification, can inflect performative participatory interventions. Likewise, 
performative sensibilities can circulate within modernist participation activities (see, e.g., Pelling 
2007; Turnhout et al 2010). And it bears emphasizing that power relations circulate within and 
through any form of participation – participation is always entangled within  (Cook et al 2013; 
Kesby 2007) However, these overstated divisions help us identify the possibilities for an 
affirmative biopolitics of participation that works against the categorical impulse to turn 
constitutive power and its formative affective relations into governable substances such as 
adaptive capacity and social capital.  
 How might future research advance this affirmative biopolitics? We see two potential 
interrelated avenues – although again, others are certainly possible. The first involves sensitivity 
to multiplicity within participatory encounters. This is a matter of de-territorializing bodies and 
processes from established categories of knowledge, in order that they may be re-territorialized 
in new ways through participatory activities. Key here is a genealogical ethic that continually 
looks towards what Foucault calls subjugated knowledge, or different experiences of social (and 
ecological) struggle, suffering, and violence that circulate below the threshold of discursivity 
(Foucault 2003; Philo 2007). These are experiences and knowledges that may not be 
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communicable through language because they cannot be shoehorned into conceptual categories 
shared by all participants (Grove 2013c). Nonetheless, they offer a window on alternative 
experiences and desires – of vulnerability, poverty, suffering, security, development, resilience, 
and so forth – that may point towards new lines of flight (Povinelli 2011). This requires a 
radicalization of the relationship between researchers and local knowledge (Pugh, 2013). Rather 
than finding ways to translate this knowledge into categories that can be used by state agents or 
researchers – in other words, assimilating the other into the self – the challenge is to find ways to 
relate to this other as other (Cavell 1981, 2010; Barnett 2005). 
 This brings us to our second possibility. De-territorialization also requires the researcher 
see herself as other, becoming ‘part’ of the assemblage. This process of becoming-other opens 
participatory activities to unforeseen, potentially radical possibilities. People may take part in 
participatory development activities for a variety of reasons; some may align with the goals of 
the project organizers, others may not. In this case, the organizers are less facilitators or 
instructors than resources marginalized peoples can creatively utilize in their daily struggles for 
survival and dignity in neoliberal environments that often deny both. Becoming-resource 
involves two kinds of reflection: first, as above, a genealogical sensitivity to multiplicity in the 
present. Participants may be enacting multiple forms of development, adaptation, resilience, and 
so forth, not all of which will be readily visible to organizers (Pugh 2013). Second, becoming-
resource also involves recognizing how the position of ‘researcher’ is itself an assemblage of 
forces and capacities that could be useful for others seeking to fight inequality and suffering. 
This involves a different kind of reflection: reflection not on how one’s subject position results in 
partial knowledge, but rather how positionality equips each participant with unique capacities, or 
weapons that might be useful in shared struggles for common goals despite various axes of 
difference (Nagar and Ali 2002). 
In summary, we suggest that assemblage thinking opens the possibility for radically 
politicizing the position of the researcher conducting participatory work:
4
 to see the researcher as 
both the content of participatory assemblages, and also the expression of other assemblages, all 
of which create biopolitical effects and affective potential (cf. Massumi 1992). We can no longer 
claim that participation necessarily empowers marginalized peoples, but we can recognize how it 
offers a variety of resources for both researchers and research subjects to challenge uneven 
power relations in potentially unexpected ways. The challenge moving forward is to devise ways 
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of engaging participants – both human and non-human – that work against the categorical 
closures of a liberal will to truth and its privileged centering of the researcher.  
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 Our use of the term diagram does not refer to the common participatory technique of diagrams. Instead, 
as we detail below, our use of this term draws on Deleuzian philosophy, in which a diagram is a virtual, 
ideal set of relations between affective relations.   
 
2
 Here, we use the term biopower in a Foucauldian/autonomist Marxist sense as a normative mode of 
power that seeks to improve and develop a population’s quality of life.  Biopower operates through a 
variety of techniques and rationalities, such as disciplinary mechanisms of individuation and surveillance, 
biopolitical techniques of statistical analysis, security mechanisms that regulate circulation, and 
environmental techniques that shape the affective life-world in which people, things, and information 
encounter one another (see Anderson 2012; Grove 2013b).  
 
3
 These approaches to participation could themselves be differentiated in terms of how each conceive the 
body, materiality, discourse, and so forth – but this falls beyond the scope of our more limited and coarse 
review here.  
 
4
 There are interesting parallels here between assemblage thinking and Third World, feminism (Sandoval 
2000; Lugones 2003). While each conceives the ‘body’ in a different way (cf. Massumi 2002), this is 
nonetheless an interesting avenue for future research as well. 
